# PRC Growth – Mini-Debate

## Opening thoughts

### This page says “take notes on me”

## Lesson Plan # 1

### Lesson plan – described

Highlight and Tag the following cards.

Choose the best card for supporting the Aff claim that BIT solves the Chinese economy.

Discuss the strengths-weaknesses of each card.

### Opening sub exercise

#### If you were finalizing a PRC Growth advantage for the 1AC, which of these solvency cards (for the BIT solving the PRC econ) would you choose and why ?... Also – tag and underline each card:

#### Option # 1 – The Schwartz ev

Tag me

Schwartz ‘14

Mark Schwartz is The Chair of Goldman Sachs Asia Pacific. Mark earned an MBA, an MPP and a BA from Harvard University and is on the Boards of Dean’s Advisors at Harvard College, Harvard Business School and the Harvard School of Public Health. - “A BIT of Help for the U.S. and China” – Wall Street Journal - April 2, 2014 - <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303532704579476720853893300>

For China, the BIT will help advance the economic reform goals reiterated by its leaders at last month's National People's Congress. It can help China achieve these goals by increasing capital available to private firms (especially small- and medium-sized businesses), which often rely on informal lending. The foreign capital, and the management expertise that so often comes with it, would promote innovation and entrepreneurship, which are critical to any economy's long-term success. Deploying private capital also helps foster healthy competition, making state-owned enterprises more efficient and better suited to compete in the global marketplace. Nor are business benefits the only advantage to a U.S.-China investment treaty. There would also be considerable political advantages to concluding a deal. The difficulties faced by each country's investors in the other's economy have created significant friction between Washington and Beijing over the years. This is the case both when Chinese investments in the U.S. generate political controversy, and when American companies discover they aren't allowed to invest in booming Chinese industries. An investment treaty would help ratchet down such tensions by improving market access and ensuring greater predictability. Leaders of the two largest economies in the world should focus on policies and initiatives big enough to result in meaningful economic growth but modest enough to be achieved. The U.S.-China investment treaty is one such initiative. Both sides have a great opportunity to advance their countries' interests and the global economy. The business communities on both sides of the Pacific have much to gain and should come together to play a constructive role supporting the negotiations and seizing the opportunity to do our BIT for global growth.

#### Strengths of Schwartz:

#### Weaknesses of Schwartz:

#### Option # 2 – The Paulson ev

Tag me

Paulson ‘13

Henry Paulson was formerly the U.S. Treasury secretary and now serves as the Chair of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago – “The Path to Double Happiness” – Wall Street Journal - June 4, 2013 - http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323469804578523144222235104

In addition to addressing these two key issues, promoting cross-border investment flows is also necessary. One vehicle for doing so, while advancing negotiations on market access and securing equal competitive conditions, is the Bilateral Investment Treaty, or BIT. Such a treaty would enhance investor protections for both sides. If China is to achieve its new economic model, it must introduce competition into its economy. In financial services, for example, allowing foreign financial firms to compete equally will create more open and efficient capital markets and help transition China to a nation of investors, not just savers. Beijing should also introduce more competition to help its own private sector. Anticompetitive practices hurt Chinese private firms nearly as much as foreign ones. For all their subsidies, benefits and preferential access to credit available only to state-owned enterprises, it is private firms that are the major source of Chinese job creation. Weaning state-owned companies off subsidies will benefit them by making them more competitive. It also would ensure market rules for the private, small and medium-size businesses that create most Chinese jobs, yet are largely excluded from state-backed loans and resource subsidies. Ultimately, both countries need capital to flow more freely: Americans because they need job-creating capital flows, including direct investment from China, and the Chinese because Beijing wants to invest more in the U.S. China complains about a lack of clarity in the U.S. regulatory framework. The U.S. could help address that concern by enacting more transparent investment policies, which would lead to more Chinese investment in the U.S. This is a rare moment of opportunity for both countries. We can continue to play defense, or we can play offense by using negotiations to make our economies more balanced. If we squander the moment, we will regret it.

#### Strengths of Paulson:

#### Weaknesses of Paulson:

#### Option # 3 – The Schneider ev

Tag me

Schneider ‘13

Howard Schneider covers international economics at the Post. He has been at the paper for 20 years in a variety of reporting and editing roles, and served abroad as bureau chief in Jerusalem, Cairo and Toronto. The author also holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Economics from the University of Maryland College Park - “China agrees to broad investment talks” – Washington Post - July 11, 2013 - <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/china-agrees-to-broad-investment-talks/2013/07/11/2d535930-ea63-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html>

China and the United States have agreed to restart negotiations over a possible investment treaty that could substantially open the Chinese economy to more American companies. During high-level talks over the past two days, Chinese officials agreed to drop a longstanding demand that negotiations over a Bilateral Investment Treaty would have to exclude sensitive or developing sectors of the economy that it wanted to protect. Although many American companies have businesses in China, investment there is governed by a strict set of rules that often limits foreign ownership — a policy, U.S. officials argue, that will crimp China’s growth in the long term and which limits the benefits American companies and workers can gain from China’s economic expansion. American officials characterized the change in negotiating policy as a major concession and a sign that the new Chinese government wants to speed economic opening. The concession is no guarantee that a treaty will ever be signed, or that any future pact will be as comprehensive as U.S. officials and business executives hope. Indeed, BIT talks have technically been underway for five years but have been stalled for much of that time. Still, “the commitment made today stands to be a significant breakthrough,” Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said in a statement. It marks the first time China has agreed to talks that “include all sectors and stages of investment.” The United States has BITs with 41 developing countries, from economic successes such as Poland to strategic allies such as Egypt and small countries such as Albania. While the world’s industrial countries are generally open to foreign investors and have trustworthy courts and political institutions, BITs are used to open up developing markets, encourage the flow of capital across borders and protect it once it gets there. In China’s case, U.S. officials say they hope such a treaty would mark a turning point in U.S.-China economic relations — allowing American companies, particularly in services and other areas where they hold a competitive advantage, to benefit from China’s large population and growing wealth. The announcement of the investment talks was the most prominent outcome of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue held over the last two days. Although it may signal the reformist intentions of new President Xi Jinping, it also reflects China’s anxiety over the economic constraints it is starting to feel. Foreign investment has been key to the country’s growth over the last 20 years, for example, but in the case of capital from the U.S. that has begun to flag.

#### Strengths of Schneider:

#### Weaknesses of Schneider:

## Lesson Plan #2

### Explain the strategic importance of this card

Tag me

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

The real risk to China's economy, and to Xi's fortunes, comes not from the stock market's raw economic impact but from the damage done to the government's credibility. Xi's strongman image suffered in the wake of the market collapse. His government had vocally encouraged average Chinese citizens to enter the country's stock market under the premise that good returns would incentivize higher spending, and was embarrassed when those investors were singed by the crash.24 The government then publicly staked its credibility on a commitment to arrest the stock market decline, but its ill-conceived market manipulations and hasty currency devaluations were of limited effectiveness. Eventually, China was able to reverse the declines, but similar or repeated episodes will undermine the party's legitimacy. Aside from the perceptual costs posed by such economic downturns, Xi faces the considerable risk that a prolonged slowdown will directly affect the welfare of the average Chinese citizen. The possibility of a hard landing looms, and an economic wreck or a serious financial crisis could produce years of prolonged stagnation and slow growth that could shake the party to its core. Even absent such a disaster, if growth continues to slow, it will worsen a number of internal trends. The labor market already struggles to absorb the eight million college graduates China's universities produce each year. Blue-collar wages that had risen for a decade have been stagnant for well over a year as layoffs continue in coastal factories, with labor disputes doubling in 2014 and again in 2015.25 Chinese companies also face challenges, as corporate debt grows to 160 percent of China's GDP, up from 98 percent in 2008 and more than twice the current U.S. level of 70 percent. The fragile recovery in the country's property market could face a reversal that would undercut what is the biggest store of household wealth for Chinese families. These problems could intertwine with the psychic impact of another stock market swing or economic crisis, which could further erode consumer confidence and jeopardize China's economic reorientation.26 Business and investor trust have similarly been hit, largely because the government's panicked attempts to control the market signaled the hesitancy of its commitment to reform. If the government's reputation is diminished and economic growth remains stagnant, then the leadership will grow increasingly worried about social unrest. Past economic crises contributed to outbreaks of mass protests, including those in 19 86 and 1989 that brought down two Chinese leaders, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and led to the violence in Tiananmen Square. Although the party weathered the stock market slumps reasonably well, there is no guarantee it will be so fortunate in a future crisis.

## Lesson Plan #3

### Explaining the mini-debate

Take notes here

### Tentative 1AC Module

#### Contention # \_\_\_ is Chinese Economic Growth

#### US foreign investment is starting to drop in the squo. A B.I.T. would reverse this. Investment key to check major declines in China’s Economy.

Schneider ‘13

Howard Schneider covers international economics at the Post. He has been at the paper for 20 years in a variety of reporting and editing roles, and served abroad as bureau chief in Jerusalem, Cairo and Toronto. The author also holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Economics from the University of Maryland College Park - “China agrees to broad investment talks” – Washington Post - July 11, 2013 - <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/china-agrees-to-broad-investment-talks/2013/07/11/2d535930-ea63-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html>

China and the United States have agreed to restart negotiations over a possible investment treaty that could substantially open the Chinese economy to more American companies. During high-level talks over the past two days, Chinese officials agreed to drop a longstanding demand that negotiations over a Bilateral Investment Treaty would have to exclude sensitive or developing sectors of the economy that it wanted to protect. Although many American companies have businesses in China, investment there is governed by a strict set of rules that often limits foreign ownership — a policy, U.S. officials argue, that will crimp China’s growth in the long term and which limits the benefits American companies and workers can gain from China’s economic expansion. American officials characterized the change in negotiating policy as a major concession and a sign that the new Chinese government wants to speed economic opening. The concession is no guarantee that a treaty will ever be signed, or that any future pact will be as comprehensive as U.S. officials and business executives hope. Indeed, BIT talks have technically been underway for five years but have been stalled for much of that time. Still, “the commitment made today stands to be a significant breakthrough,” Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said in a statement. It marks the first time China has agreed to talks that “include all sectors and stages of investment.” The United States has BITs with 41 developing countries, from economic successes such as Poland to strategic allies such as Egypt and small countries such as Albania. While the world’s industrial countries are generally open to foreign investors and have trustworthy courts and political institutions, BITs are used to open up developing markets, encourage the flow of capital across borders and protect it once it gets there. In China’s case, U.S. officials say they hope such a treaty would mark a turning point in U.S.-China economic relations — allowing American companies, particularly in services and other areas where they hold a competitive advantage, to benefit from China’s large population and growing wealth. The announcement of the investment talks was the most prominent outcome of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue held over the last two days. Although it may signal the reformist intentions of new President Xi Jinping, it also reflects China’s anxiety over the economic constraints it is starting to feel. Foreign investment has been key to the country’s growth over the last 20 years, for example, but in the case of capital from the U.S. that has begun to flag.

#### Xi’s avoided the temptations diversionary war. This will end if the Chinese economy declines.

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

One downside to Xi's breathtaking success in consolidating power is that it has left him with near total responsibility for his government's policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock market slowdown to labor market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the decision-making process have made him a powerful but potentially exposed leader. With Xi's image and political position vulnerable to China's economic downturn, his country's external behavior may increasingly be guided by his own domestic political imperatives. For the last three years, with China's economy still producing robust growth numbers, such concerns have not fundamentally influenced Xi's foreign policy. Xi has been able to be continuously proactive, and he has used his power to take China's foreign policy in a new direction. He has boldly departed from Deng's injunction to keep a low profile and has reclaimed islands, created international institutions, pressured neighbors, and deployed military assets to disputed regions. Xi's foreign policy has been assertive, confident, and, importantly, a diversified mix of both hard and soft elements. Even as China has taken firm steps on territorial issues, it has used geoeconomic instruments to offer generous loans and investments, and even created new organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).1 By combining inducements with intimidation, Xi has demonstrated the benefits of cooperating with China as well as the economic and military costs of opposing it, especially on issues important to Beijing. Today, China's thirty-year era of 10 percent annual growth appears to have ended, with official statistics placing gross domestic product (GDP) growth below 7 percent, the government reducing its growth target to 6.5 percent, and a number of major banks and respected forecasters arguing the true growth rate is far lower—and will remain below 5 percent for years.3 In light of this deepening economic slowdown, the future trajectory of Xi's external policy is in question. Some elements, including China's geoeconomic policies, will endure; nevertheless, China's foreign policy may well be driven increasingly by the risk of domestic political instability. For this reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese nationalism—long a pillar of the state's legitimacy—to compensate for the political harm of a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt rivals who might use nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish his own image. Chinese nationalism has long been tied to foreign affairs, especially memories of foreign domination and territorial loss. For example, Xi may be less able or willing to compromise in public, especially on territorial issues or other matters that are rooted in national sentiment, for fear that it would harm his political position. He may provoke disputes with neighbors, use increasingly strident rhetoric in defense of China's national interests, and take a tougher line in relations with the United States and its allies to shift public focus away from economic troubles. He may also turn to greater economic protectionism. These changes come at a time when Xi's tight control of the decisionmaking process has made it harder for U.S. policymakers to anticipate China's next moves. Familiar interlocutors at the State Council and Foreign Ministry, who once provided much-needed insight into an often mysterious policymaking process, are no longer central within it. As the shroud of secrecy surrounding Chinese decision-making thickens, what remains clear is that dealing with China will require a more nuanced understanding of the man with singular control over the country's foreign policy future. It will also necessitate an appreciation of the interaction between his internal political requirements and his foreign policy agenda. Finally, it will demand a clear-eyed acceptance of the fact that Xi has ushered in a new era of Chinese regional and global diplomacy, one that will push the West to evaluate its overall approach to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and to the powerful but exposed leader who makes its foreign policy.

#### Chinese Econ growth checks nationalist flares that escalate territorial disputes. Checks won’t solve.

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. Since 1989, the party has deliberately and carefully laid the foundation for such a strategy through patriotic education, censorship, government-backed protests against Japan, and relentless news and popular media that have reinforced a nationalist victimization narrative. As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. For example, an emphasis on territorial disputes and historical grievances could partially divert attention from the country's economic woes and arrest a potential decline in his public approval; in contrast, a visible setback or controversial concession on such issues could undermine his standing with Chinese citizens and party elites. On economic matters, concerns over growth and employment may lead China to become increasingly recalcitrant and self-interested. In the future, Xi could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers are running articles blaming the country's economic slump on efforts undertaken by insidious "foreign forces" that seek to sabotage the country's rise. Even if Xi does not seek more combative relations with the West, he will nonetheless find it difficult to negotiate publicly on a variety of issues, especially when nationalist sentiment runs high. On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record. A dangerous but unlikely possibility is that Xi may even be tempted to use military force to instigate limited conflicts against the Philippines, Vietnam, or Japan. Given that Japan is a prominent target of China's propaganda and media, and that memories of Japan's brutal occupation are still influential, ties between China and Japan may continue to worsen.

#### SCS conflict causes huge death tolls.

Wittner ‘11

(Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", [www.huntingtonnews.net/14446](http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446))

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

#### And nationalist spats over the ECS will escalate - death tolls would be enormous.

Baker ‘12

(Kevin R., Member of the Compensation Committee of Calfrac, Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Century Oilfield Services Inc. from August 2005 until November 10, 2009, when it was acquired by the Corporation. He also has served as the President of Baycor Capital Inc., 9/17/2012, “What Would Happen if China and Japan Went to War?”, http://appreviews4u.com/2012/09/17/what-would-happen-if-china-and-japan-went-to-war/)

China is not an isolationist country but it is quite nationalistic. Their allies include, Russia, which is a big super power, Pakistan and Iran as well as North Korea. They have more allies than Japan, although most relations have been built on economic strategies, being a money-centric nation. Countries potentially hostile toward China in the event of a Japan vs. China war include Germany, Britain, Australia and South Korea. So even though Japan does not outwardly build relationships with allies, Japan would have allies rallying around them if China were to attack Japan. The island dispute would not play out as it did in the UK vs. Argentina island dispute, as both sides could cause massive damage to each other, whereas the UK was far superior in firepower compared to Argentina. Conclusion Even though China outweighs Japan in numbers, the likelihood that a war would develop into a nuclear war means that numbers don’t really mean anything anymore. **The nuclear capabilities of Japan and China would mean that each country could destroy each other many times over**. **The** island dispute **would then escalate to possible** mass extinction for the human race. The nuclear fall out would affect most of Asia and to a certain extent the West. **If the allies were then to turn on each other it would** spell the end of the human race. Bear in mind that it will take an estimated 10,000 years for Chernobyl to become safe to walk around and you’ll get an idea of what state land masses will be in after a war of such magnitude. I say ‘land masses’ as countries and nations would cease to exist then and it would be a case of ‘if’ and ‘where’ could human beings, plant life and animals could exist, if at all possible, **which is very doubtful**. Even with underground bunkers, just how long could people survive down there? With plant and animal life eradicated above? I would say maybe 20 years at best, if there are ample supplies of course.

#### Prior economic declines hasn’t undermined Xi to the point of playing the nationalism card. The next one will

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

The real risk to China's economy, and to Xi's fortunes, comes not from the stock market's raw economic impact but from the damage done to the government's credibility. Xi's strongman image suffered in the wake of the market collapse. His government had vocally encouraged average Chinese citizens to enter the country's stock market under the premise that good returns would incentivize higher spending, and was embarrassed when those investors were singed by the crash.24 The government then publicly staked its credibility on a commitment to arrest the stock market decline, but its ill-conceived market manipulations and hasty currency devaluations were of limited effectiveness. Eventually, China was able to reverse the declines, but similar or repeated episodes will undermine the party's legitimacy. Aside from the perceptual costs posed by such economic downturns, Xi faces the considerable risk that a prolonged slowdown will directly affect the welfare of the average Chinese citizen. The possibility of a hard landing looms, and an economic wreck or a serious financial crisis could produce years of prolonged stagnation and slow growth that could shake the party to its core. Even absent such a disaster, if growth continues to slow, it will worsen a number of internal trends. The labor market already struggles to absorb the eight million college graduates China's universities produce each year. Blue-collar wages that had risen for a decade have been stagnant for well over a year as layoffs continue in coastal factories, with labor disputes doubling in 2014 and again in 2015.25 Chinese companies also face challenges, as corporate debt grows to 160 percent of China's GDP, up from 98 percent in 2008 and more than twice the current U.S. level of 70 percent. The fragile recovery in the country's property market could face a reversal that would undercut what is the biggest store of household wealth for Chinese families. These problems could intertwine with the psychic impact of another stock market swing or economic crisis, which could further erode consumer confidence and jeopardize China's economic reorientation.26 Business and investor trust have similarly been hit, largely because the government's panicked attempts to control the market signaled the hesitancy of its commitment to reform. If the government's reputation is diminished and economic growth remains stagnant, then the leadership will grow increasingly worried about social unrest. Past economic crises contributed to outbreaks of mass protests, including those in 19 86 and 1989 that brought down two Chinese leaders, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and led to the violence in Tiananmen Square. Although the party weathered the stock market slumps reasonably well, there is no guarantee it will be so fortunate in a future crisis.

### Tentative 1NC Frontline

#### The advantage isn’t unique - Brexit will boost Chinese economy

Schuman 16— Michael, journalist based in Beijing and author of "Confucius: And the World He Created”, 2016 (“Who Wins From Brexit? China,” Bloomberg, June 24, Available Online at http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-24/china-could-be-the-biggest-winner-from-brexit, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union is creating a lot of losers: London’s finance industry. British Prime Minister David Cameron. The pound. The grand cause of European integration. But out of all of the market turmoil and uncertainty will emerge at least one big winner: China. In the short term, of course, China’s struggling economy may take a hit from the chaos in the EU, its second-largest trading partner. A smaller, less-stable European market and more cash-strapped consumers aren’t good news for Chinese exporters. Over the longer term, though, Brexit is almost certainly in China’s economic and political interests. Even a fully united Europe -- burdened as it is by debt woes, high costs, overbearing bureaucracy and, in some cases, dubious competitiveness -- has had a tough time competing and contending with China. Now fractured, the EU can't help but pose less of a counterweight to China’s rise on the world stage. Remember why the European Union was formed in the first place. Proponents like to stress the EU's mission to promote peace and democracy. More practically, a key goal of unification was to enhance the region’s clout in the global economy. The varied nations of Europe understood that they'd be much stronger if they forged a common market with shared institutions and even a regional currency, the euro, than if they tried to compete as independent units. Europe hoped to evolve from a collection of rich but contentious states into a giant economic bloc on par with the U.S. and more recently, China. In reality, Europe has struggled to fulfill that ideal and has suffered for it. Persistent nationalism has repeatedly limited its ability to forge a common front on both trade and geopolitical issues. Nowhere has this failure been more obvious than in Europe's relations with China. As a whole, the EU should in theory wield significant power in pressing Beijing to open its markets and play fair on trade. Instead, European nations have routinely squandered that advantage by competing with each other for Chinese investment and favors. Shortly after the U.K.’s Cameron fawned over visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping last year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel showed up in Beijing, seeking her own business deals. The opportunities for China to divide and conquer -- both to strike better bargains and to undercut complaints about its own market-distorting behavior -- will only increase now that Europe's second-largest economy has gone its own way. European businesses would certainly have been better served if the EU could have cobbled together a common policy towards China. While Chinese companies have gone on a major shopping spree in Europe -- even buying stakes in beloved football clubs -- Merkel, on a recent visit to Beijing, was left griping that foreign firms deserved to “enjoy the same rights and privileges as domestic companies” in China. If she and Cameron and Europe’s other leaders had locked arms and fought for those rights together, they’d have had a much greater chance of success. Now instead, a truncated common market in Europe will undercut the global competitiveness of its companies. European firms -- from big banks to tech start-ups -- would be much better positioned to take on rising Chinese champions if they were able to capitalize on a full-fledged Europe-wide market. Politically, too, Brexit can only widen China's scope for action. As China challenges the West’s cherished institutions and ideals, from navigation rights to human rights, the importance of defending those rules and values is rising steadily. A united EU could have presented a serious check to Beijing's growing assertiveness. We've already seen the alternative: When the U.S. expressed concerns last year about China's plans to set up a rival to the World Bank, the Europeans stumbled over themselves to sign up, undermining any hope of extracting concessions from China’s leaders.

#### Empirically false – growth rates have been slowing, and the impacts haven’t happened. And, there have been tensions in the SCS and ECS without any escalation.

#### China’s economy resilient

Rapoza 16— Kenneth, Contributor at Forbes, Fifteen years experience reporting for the mainstream press on everything from the Iraq War to housing bubbles in Boston for The Boston Globe, to local features and international news coverage in Brazil, 2016 (“Chinese Yuan Appears 'Unbreakable',” Forbes, June 21, Available Online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/06/21/chinese-yuan-appears-unbreakable/#4ec9edea4e42, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

The Chinese yuan seems unbreakable. Having started the year worth 6.51 to the dollar, it’s now trading at 6.58 to the dollar and one of country’s biggest banks doesn’t see it getting much weaker from here. The Bank of Communications said in a note to clients on Tuesday that declines in net foreign exchange sales — from U.S. dollars to Hong Kong dollars and euros — means the market is not as worried about a further weakening of the yuan. No one is rushing for an exit. Chinese banks reported a combined $12.5 billion of net foreign currency purchases in May, down 47% from April, official data showed on Monday. The Bank of Communications report argued that the drop off is mainly due to closer scrutiny over capital outflow by the People’s Bank of China. Beijing has been opening up the country’s current account, allowing for Chinese businesses and individuals to take money abroad and invest in everything from real estate to financial securities. Many have taken advantage of this rule change in light of China’s slowing GDP growth. China’s burgeoning middle class, and its mega rich, have been mostly confined to Hong Kong and the mainland. But over the last few years, laws have allowed for them to take their cash elsewhere and they are doing so in greater numbers. As a result of that outflow, coupled with foreign portfolio outflows as well, the monetary authorities have put out constant warnings about clamping down on locals looking to take money out of China. China’s careful monitoring and an active central bank, have kept the currency stable at a time when investment firms were figuring a 7 to 1 exchange rate was right around the corner. The dollar has gained only 1% against the yuan year-to-date ending June 20.

#### No proof that the US is key to the Chinese Economy – they can rely on the markets of other nations

#### Chinese diversionary war will never happen.

Levi & Economy ‘16

et al; Michael A. Levi and Elizabeth Economy are both Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), director of CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, and director of the CFR program on energy security and climate change. He is an expert on energy, climate change, nuclear security, and the interplay of global economics and international politics. Before joining CFR, Dr. Levi was a nonresident science fellow and a science and technology fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. Prior to that, he was director of the Federation of American Scientists' Strategic Security Project. Elizabeth Economy is the C.V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Economy has published widely on both Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Dr. Economy is a frequent guest on nationally broadcast television and radio programs, has testified before Congress on numerous occasions, and regularly consults for U.S. government agencies and companies. Levi & Economy hosted a workshop along with the Council on Foreign Relations' Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies and Asia Studies program. This report is includes the thoughts of the CFR participants at the workshop – “Economic and Geopolitical Fallout From China's Slowing Growth” - February 25,2016 – pdf available via: http://www.cfr.org/china/economic-geopolitical-fallout-chinas-slowing-growth/p37554

But Beijing Is Unlikely to Wage War if the Economy Crashes By the same token, analysts should probably discard the notion that a crash of the domestic economy would provoke a Chinese military adventure abroad in order to distract Chinese people from upheaval at home. This "wag the dog” scenario may gain currency with screenplay writers and conspiracy buffs, but it is not borne out by history. Although it is true that strife-torn countries often get embroiled in external wars, it is rarely because their leaders set out to generate a diversionary activity for their restive populace. Indeed, most workshop participants argued that if China were beset by an acute internal crisis, the Communist Party would almost certainly refocus its energy and resources inward. The leadership and its security apparatus, including components of the military, would have their hands full protecting against social instability, tamping down the activities of Uighur and Tibetan separatists, and maintaining the cohesiveness of the party itself. To launch a foreign war in an atmosphere of domestic public grievance would be particularly dangerous for Beijing. If China sustained a defeat at the hands of the Japanese or U.S. navy, the leadership would compound its reputation for economic mismanagement with one for military ineptitude—a potentially lethal cocktail for the ruling party.

#### No SCS or ECS war

Ignatius ‘14

David Ignatius is an associate editor and columnist for the Washington Post. He is a former Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and currently Senior Fellow to the Future of Diplomacy Program. “A U.S.-China ‘reset’?” – Washington Post – December 16th - https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-a-us-china-reset/2014/12/16/981db07e-855f-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25\_story.html

This year began with some Chinese and American foreign-policy analysts looking back a century to World War I and wondering if confrontation was inevitable between a rising power and a dominant one. But now there has been progress on climate, trade and security issues and what seems a modest “reset” of the Sino-American relationship. Future disagreements between the United States and China are inevitable. But the surprise of a high-level dialogue here last weekend was the interest by both sides in exploring what the Chinese like to call “win-win” cooperation. “I don’t believe there will be a military confrontation between the two countries,” insisted one of China’s top American experts, who not long ago was warning about strains in the relationship. Recent disputes over maritime boundaries in the East and South China seas are “not particularly dangerous,” said another prominent Chinese scholar.

#### 7. Western growth efforts – like the Aff – are key anti-green Chinese economic growth.

Li, ‘14

(Minqi, Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, *Peak Oil, Climate Change, and the Limits to China’s Economic Growth,* pg. 169, Routledge)

Without fundamental changes, the most likely scenario is for China to continue on the current path of capitalist accumulation. The Chinese government will undertake further "economic reforms." The remaining state-owned enterprises will be privatized. Without serious adjustment of economic and social policies, inequality in income and wealth distribution will keep rising. **Environmental conditions will continue to deteriorate.** With mass consumption depressed**, the economy will depend on** excessively high levels of investment **to sustain growth.** In Chapter 7, it is argued that these tendencies are likely to result in a general economic, social, and environmental crisis in the 2020s, leading to the collapse of the Chinese economy. Given China's central position in the global division of labor, a collapse of the Chinese economy may lead to the collapse of the global economy**.**

#### China is key to the global ecology – the impact’s massive death tolls.

Li, ‘16

(Minqi, Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, *China and the 21st Century Crisis*, Pluto Press, Pg. 11-12)

The pursuit of infinite economic growth is the defining feature of modern capitalism. But the exponential growth of material production and consumption has depleted natural resources and degraded the environment. Much of the global environmental space was used up by the global capitalist expansion during the second half of the twentieth century. In the early twenty-first century, **various global ecological systems are** on the verge of collapse**.** In particular, impending climate catastrophes threaten to undermine the foundation of human civilization. These developments suggest that the various conditions, which historically have underpinned the normal operation of the capitalist world system, are being fundamentally transformed and the basic laws of motion of capitalism can no longer be sustained. China is set to overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy. The Chinese working class is the worlds largest. In a few years, a militant working class movement is likely to emerge in China. **China is also the world's largest energy consumer and greenhouse gas emitter. Therefore, China is** at the center **of the contemporary global economic, social, and** ecological contradictions.

## Useful Aff backline cards

### yes SCS war coming – uniqueness

SCS aggression is at a tipping point

Pickrell, MA in IR, PhD Candidate @ Central China University, ‘15

(Ryan, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?” October 26, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3>)

Conflict between a rising power and an established power **is not inevitable** as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States **are rapidly approaching this point**. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly **relying on their military capabilities** and hard power tactics. That’s **especially true** in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain **unwilling to compromise** and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and **closer to cooperation and rapprochement**. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst.

Failed pursuit of strategic stability

China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order.

Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed.

America’s approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles China’s old “shelving disputes and pursuing joint development” strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. **Eventually, the dirt spills out.** Sooner or later, unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach **is only a** temporary stop **on the road to functional strategic stability.** At worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid addressing China’s demands that the United States acknowledge China’s rise to great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the “new model of major-country relations.” China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic stability. While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or implementable **solution** for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues unmanaged, **unchecked and confrontation is** steadily evolving into conflict.

Drawing Lines in the “Sea”

### ECS War - A-to no escalation

Causes accidental launch and miscalculation

Hellman 13 (Martin Hellman Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering Stanford University, 1/22/2013, "Could Japan Drag America into War with China", nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2013/01/22/could-japan-drag-america-into-war-with-china/)

Several earlier posts on this blog have highlighted the risk that China and Japan might come to blows over a few tiny, uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. One pathway to war is **inadvertent escalation** as a result of both nations sending jet fighters over the disputed territory. As noted in an an article in yesterday’s New York Times:

In the past several months, both China and Japan have sent civilian maritime vessels to the waters around the uninhabited islands. On Jan. 10, China ordered a surveillance aircraft to fly near the area. In response, Japan scrambled F-15 fighter jets to take a look, and in response to the Japanese, the Chinese dispatched J-10 fighter jets.

**The** tit-for-tat **moves have raised concerns that an** accident **could occur and lead to a** dangerous cycle of retaliation.

Under a longstanding security treaty with Japan, **the United States is obliged to defend the country,** including the uninhabited islands, a position that Mrs. Clinton referred to at the news conference. She also repeated that Washington recognized that the islands were administered by Japan.

For its part, China insists that the islands belong to China, a claim that it says is supported by historical documents.

If war should break out, the US is on record as saying that its mutual security treaty with Japan extends to these islands, meaning **the US would have to fight a** nuclear-armed **China**.

### Chinese Growth = Greener than ever

#### China’s growth is key to its climate control

Henderson et al 16— Geoffrey Henderson, Project Specialist for China FAQs within WRI's Climate and Energy Program, Ranping Song, Developing Country Climate Action Manager @ WRI, Paul Joffe, Senior Foreign Policy Counsel @WRI, 2016 (“5 Questions: What Does China’s New Five-Year Plan Mean for Climate Action?,” World Resources Institute, March 18, Available Online at http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/03/5-questions-what-does-chinas-new-five-year-plan-mean-climate-action, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

China plans to develop its economy by more than 6.5 percent per year over the next five years. Under the plan, this growth will increasingly come from services—which will rise from 50.5 to 56 percent of the economy by 2020—and more innovative and efficient manufacturing. These sectors typically have lower air pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions than China’s traditional growth engines, like heavy industry and infrastructure construction. The plan sets out a new round of targets for the carbon and energy intensity of China’s economy. With China’s new target for an 18 percent reduction in carbon-intensity from 2015 levels, we estimate that China will actually reduce its carbon intensity 48 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, exceeding its original target of a 40-45 percent reduction by that year. It will also be a first step toward achieving its Paris Agreement pledge to reduce carbon intensity 60 to 65 percent by 2030. The plan also includes a goal to reduce energy intensity by 15 percent, suggests that China’s most-developed eastern regions will be the first to peak their carbon emissions, and builds on efforts to increase China’s forest stock. For the first time, the plan includes quantified guidance on energy consumption control, stating that China should limit its energy use to 5 billion tons of standard coal equivalent. As energy is the largest source of carbon emissions, limiting energy consumption is an important component of China’s implementation of its Paris commitments. This guidance seems to be an effort to ensure an upper limit on energy consumption, as there are signs that China’s energy use could be lower than 5 billion tons in 2020. Growth in China’s energy use has slowed in recent years, and China has the potential to achieve its economic goals with less energy through energy efficiency initiatives. The new targets in the plan underscore the fact that the country is no longer merely concerned with the pace of growth, but with the quality of growth. China’s efforts on sustainable development and climate action are driven by strong national interests, such as concern about the impacts of climate change, hazardous air pollution and energy security. There’s also evidence that China’s leaders recognize the economic benefits of clean energy, and that new drivers will be required for the economy to continue its rapid economic growth. To achieve these targets, the plan calls for controlling emissions from energy-intensive industries like power and steel, building a unified national carbon emissions trading market, implementing emissions reporting and verification for key industries, and establishing a green finance system, among other measures. The plan also states that China will be actively involved in the global effort to address climate change, including advancing its own contribution, and will deepen its bilateral dialogue with other countries. These efforts will provide momentum toward stronger climate action both in China and internationally.

### Warming D

#### ( ) Warming not real- recent temperatures show no increase

Happer ‘12

(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years. Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

## Useful Neg backline cards

### Brexit – resilience

#### China’s economy resilient post-Brexit

Hamlin 16— Kevin, Economics Writer at Bloomberg, 2016 (“Brexit Seen as a Negative, or an Opportunity,” Bloomberg, June 27, Available Online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/for-china-economy-brexit-seen-as-a-negative-or-an-opportunity, Accessed 06-29-2016, AV)

After Britain’s vote to leave the European Union roiled global markets, economists are grappling with how best to gauge the potential impact on China. Views range from downbeat scenarios such as Brexit contagion weakening the yuan or undermining exports, to optimistic ones where China emerges as a safe haven amid the storm. Beyond the currency impact, economists are trying to untangle other issues such as whether China benefits from a likely delay of U.S. interest rate hikes, how it will respond to market turbulence, and whether the domestic economy and capital flows will suffer. Here’s what some China watchers are saying: ‘Bad News’ David Dollar, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution who previously was the U.S. Treasury attache in Beijing and World Bank country director for China: "Brexit is bad news for China, but I would not exaggerate the impact. It ushers in a period of more uncertainty in the global economy and probably slower growth, and that will affect China through trade. In addition, China had bet on the U.K. as the best entry point into the European market, and that no longer looks like a good bet. But China’s economy is primarily driven by domestic consumption now, so the effects will not be that great." "Probably China will use a bit more stimulus, especially credit for real estate and other investment, to maintain its growth. I would expect the trade-weighted yuan to rise as other parts of the world face more headwinds than China faces. China’s large capital outflow is likely to continue."

### Extensions – Diversionary war

#### Diversionary war theory false –Japan

Frej 11— Willa, Pierson College. She writes about China’s foreign policy as she works on her senior essay discussing the topic, 2011 (“Update: Sino-Japanese Tensions,” The Yale Globalist, Feb 23, Available Online at http://97.74.206.199/tyglobalist/onlinecontent/blogs/update-sino-japanese-tensions/, Accessed 06-23-2016)

Furthermore, leadership transitions are of note in both China and Japan, making it difficult to generalize about hawkish or conciliatory behavior on either side, since diplomacy currently consists of extensive calculations about both present and future leadership. The diversionary war theory posits that states pursue a more aggressive foreign policy when faced with domestic vulnerability. It seems as though this is what is occurring between the Chinese and the Japanese. In fact, Abe’s newfound hawkish position is surprising, given his much less hostile stance on China in the past. In 2006, he was the first Japanese prime minister to pick Beijing as the first stop of foreign visits instead of the United States. Yet when considering the heated nationalism that has also overtaken the Japanese in reaction to the Senkakus, Abe’s insistence on keeping the islands in Japanese hands falls into the diversionary war line of reasoning. But the main question on everyone’s minds is what Xi Jinping is going to bring to the table on November 8, the date of the Chinese leadership transition. According to a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, Chinese people are more hostile towards rival nations than ever before. Will fresh leadership therefore adhere to the demands of the populace? Along this line of reasoning, China will react to internal turmoil with a continual display of hostility towards Japan. What this “hostility” will specifically entail is unclear. At the very least, China will most likely continue to send patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters. The theory of diversionary war cannot, however, serve to predict the future of Sino-Japanese relations on its own. It would fail to explain China’s history of regional cooperation in response to territorial disputes. More importantly, national interests – namely economic and balance of power interests – are at stake. On the one hand, China fears the loss of strategically significant territory. Admittedly, these islands are nothing but a cluster of rocks in the middle of the East China Sea, but control over this territory grants important access to fisherman and supposed untapped oil reserves. So while it is clearly in China’s best interest to fight for some level of sovereignty over the Diaoyus, a diplomatic shakeup between China and Japan would be an economic disaster. China is now Japan’s largest trading partner, and a prolonging of the territorial dispute will seriously jeopardize bilateral trade. Chances are slim that a full-blow military escalation will occur. The question, therefore, is how long leaders on both sides will play the hard line and delay constructive diplomacy in order to save face.

### Extensions – SCS war unlikely

**SCS war unlikely**

Brendan Taylor 14, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

Unlike its recent behavior in the East China Sea, Beijing’s approach toward the South China Sea disputes has traditionally been one of conflict deescalation. Beijing’s clear preference has been to manage such tensions **bilaterally**. Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of clashes with Vietnamese (and Philippine) vessels, for instance, Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October 2011 on principles for **settling maritime disputes**. Likewise in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish new hotlines to assist with managing incidents at sea and dealing with fishing disputes.32 Beijing has also shown some **willingness to take the multilateral route**. Most famously, China signed a non-binding “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” with ASEAN in November 2002. While protracted progress continues, the official position of both China and ASEAN remains to establish **a legally binding code of conduct** in the South China Sea intended to incorporate mechanisms for **avoiding incidents at sea, crisis management, confidence building measures, and joint development**.33 Beijing has certainly not shown similar flexibility in relation to any of its other publicly-declared “core interests.” At China’s insistence, for example, discussion of Taiwan is strictly off limits in Asia’s multilateral forums.

China backs off

Brendan Taylor 14, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

But **doubts remain** over whether Beijing truly regards the South China Sea as a “core interest.” Michael Swaine reports that his investigation of Chinese official sources “**failed to unearth a single example** of a PRC official or an official PRC document or media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC ‘core interest.’”25 By contrast, Chinese officials have not exhibited such reticence when referring publicly to Taiwan or Tibet in such terms. Nor has Beijing shown any reluctance to threaten or to actually use military force in relation to these. During the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing twice fired ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan in an effort to intimidate voters in advance of the island’s first democratic presidential election.26 China went further in March 2005 when the National People’s Congress passed an “anti-secession law” requiring the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan in the event its leaders sought to establish formal independence from the mainland.27

Explicit threats and promises of this nature **are absent** in official Chinese statements on the South China Sea even when, as in May 2012, the normally smooth-talking Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying ambiguously warned the Philippines “not to misjudge the situation” and not to “escalate tensions without considering consequences” at the height of the Scarborough Shoal standoff.28 Indeed, although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities by conducting military exercises in the South China Sea—as in March 2013 when it controversially conducted exercises within 50 miles of the Malaysian coastline—it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region **continue to be confined**, by and large, **to the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels**.29

### PRC Growth = anti-Green

#### Chinese economic slowdown key to combat climate change

Margolis 15 – Jason Margolis reports on business-and-economics related stories and has been recognized three times for “outstanding reporting” by the Society of Environmental Journalism and has received multiple reporting awards from Northern California journalism associations, 2015 (“How China’s slowing economy could help battle climate change,” December 2, Available Online at <http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-12-02/how-china-s-slowing-economy-could-help-battle-climate-change>, Accessed 06-24-2016, AH)

Last summer though, that model looked like it was crashing to a halt. The Shanghai Stock Exchange plunged sharply, pulling down markets across the globe and creating a panic among investors. It was stunning and scary to many, but economists who follow China’s economic growth weren’t caught off guard. “We always knew that was not going to be sustainable for the very long term,” says [Robert Kahn](http://www.cfr.org/experts/international-economics/robert-kahn/b16114), a senior fellow for international economics with the Council on Foreign Relations. China’s economy had been growing by 10, 12, even 14 percent in recent years. Over the next few years, Kahn expects China to grow at closer to 5 or 6 percent annually, similar to [forecasts from the International Monetary Fund.](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/update/02/) “Now to you and me, that’s still a very good number,” says Kahn. Many environmentalists also say it’s a better number for the planet. “The take-make-waste model that we have at the moment in our economy — you manufacture something, you throw it away in landfill — [it's not going to be what’s going to work](http://www.carbontrust.com/news/2015/12/cop21-consumers-behaving-badly/) for the rest of this century. It can’t be, because we're running out resources and it will result in dangerous climate change,” says Jamie Plotnek with[The Carbon Trust](http://www.carbontrust.com/home?gclid=Cj0KEQiAyvqyBRChq_iG38PgvLgBEiQAJbasd7SMXw24E8wfSrYKtJPzenX5vPP30ymXl4NlDx55IHwaAtZ98P8HAQ), a London-based organization that helps governments and businesses transition to a low-carbon economy. Climate change has been made more dangerous by how China builds things for the rest of the world. [Follow all of our coverage of the Paris talks and the global climate crisis](http://www.pri.org/tags/climate-change) A team of researchers recently [quantified the environmental costs](http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2800.html) — the carbon dioxide emissions — in manufacturing 15 products in China. “And what we show, the difference between making them in Europe and China is large,” says Laura Diaz Anadon, an [assistant professor of public policy](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/1441/laura_diaz_anadon.html) at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and visiting[senior lecturer at the University College, London](https://www.ucl.ac.uk/steapp/people/anadon). “So on average, emissions per unit mass of each product are 4.4 times greater in China than if you make them in the EU.” There are a few key reasons for this. First, China relies heavily on coal as its primary energy source, which produces a lot of greenhouse gasses. (China is [committing to reducing](http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/11/30-china-coal-consumption-context) its reliance on that fuel source.) Second, Anadon says China tends to use equipment that is less energy efficient. Now, it would be easy at this point for an environmentalist to say, OK, I’ll just buy less stuff made in China. Easier said than done. Consider your refrigerator — there’s a lot of parts making it go. Anadon’s research focuses on the parts inside made from copper, steel, and iron, the early part of the supply chain. “In terms of the consumer, I think it is actually quite hard to know what you should buy,” says Anadon. “If you were able to find out, this is made from copper made in China, or something like this, than you would know that this product has a component that has a very high carbon intensity.” “It’s an incredibly difficult question for most consumers,” says Jamie Plotnek with The Carbon Trust. He says consumers can minimize their carbon footprint by doing things like buying a smaller car, rather than an SUV. But with most products it’s really up to manufacturers to build smarter. “And that might involve, for example, a more circular approach to manufacturing where companies will design products that are supposed to be remanufactured,” says Plotnek. “You’re already seeing this now where companies, particularly in the automotive industry, are looking at remanufacturing engines and gear boxes. Then you don’t need to extract the same metals again. You can extract the economic value from that waste so actually it can be better for those companies.” Besides manufacturing smarter, China may also be moving toward manufacturing less, transitioning to a different type of economy. “That transition, or what we’ve been calling a rebalancing, meant shifting away from a manufacturing-driven model to one that was more consumer based, more oriented towards retail and financial services and the like,” says Robert Kahn. Kahn says this transition should take 5 to 7 years and will also reverberate to countries that supply China’s raw materials, places like Brazil and Australia. The climate crisis is also forcing these countries to rethink how their economies grow. Add it all up and the headlines about the next phase of globalization could read very differently.

### A-to “reforms solve for anti-green Chinese growth”

Reforms fail

Shaprio, PhD, aculty of the Global Environmental Politics program and directs the Dual Degree in Natural Resources and Sustainable Development (NRSD) with University for Peace in Costa Rica, ‘16

(Judith, *China’s Environmental Challenges*, Wiley, Conclusion)

Officials have **recognized growing levels of environmental harm** - stemming partly from a sense of lawlessness among middle-level officials and industrial leaders - and they have instituted world-class environmental regulations. **However, these laws are** poorly enforced **and the de facto reality remains** woefully behind **the ideal**. **This** implementation gap **stems at least in part from a political and social conflict between Western-style economic growth and a healthy environment**. For example, deforestation is understood as a problem that creates erosion and flooding at home; the government bans logging in sensitive river headwaters **but simultaneously fosters a manufacturing sector that supplies the furniture needs of consumers an ocean away**. Thus, the government essentially looks the other way as domestic forests continue to be cut and as timber enters - often illegally - from ravaged forests in Southeast Asia, Russia, and Africa. Water use is a similar arena where the state appears torn between conflicting goals. The massive South-North water transfer is an example: Intended to relieve water shortages in the Northeast, the project has caused dislocation and hardship for local populations and, activists argue, could create environmental problems and increase tensions with surrounding countries whose major rivers will be affected by the plan if the Western route is built. What is more, beyond its borders, **China has largely** refused to cooperate **in regional, transboundary management schemes such as the Mekong River Commission**.

### A-to “Warming Not Real”

#### ( ) Global Warming is happening – most recent and best evidence concludes that it is human induced

Muller ‘12

[Richard, professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, “The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all]

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort **involving a dozen scientists**, I concluded that global warming was real **and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct.** I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the B**erkeley** E**arth** S**urface** T**emperature** project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen **by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years**. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. **These findings are stronger than those of the** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change **[IPCC**], the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only **that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans**. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our **Berkeley Earth approach used** sophisticated statistical methods **developed largely by our lead scientist**, Robert Rohde, **which** allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that **none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions**; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (**exponentials, polynomials**), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. **By far** the best match was to the record of atmospheric **carbon dioxide** (CO2), **measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice.**